Call on Malta to question Lockerbie witness

[This is the headline over an article by Caroline Muscat in today's edition of the Maltese newspaper The Sunday Times. It reads in part:]

The Maltese authorities should launch an inquiry into the Lockerbie case and question a key Maltese witness, according to the UN monitor of the original trial of two Libyans.

Hans Koechler told The Sunday Times the government should defend the country's reputation and show the world its willingness to act in the interest of its people.

Prof Koechler was the expert picked by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to monitor the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist that found Libyan Abdelbasset Al-Megrahi guilty of the bombing. His report after the trial said that a "miscarriage of justice" had occurred.

The guilty verdict depended heavily on the testimony of Maltese witness Tony Gauci, who identified Mr Al-Megrahi as the man who bought clothes from his shop in Sliema that were later found wrapped around the bomb.

But in Mr Al-Megrahi's second appeal - which he dropped after being released from a Scottish jail on compassionate grounds - he was due to present evidence showing Mr Gauci's testimony to be replete with inconsistencies.

Documents published recently by Al-Megrahi's lawyers say that after the trial Mr Gauci was paid a sum "in excess of $2 million", while his brother Paul was paid "in excess of $1 million" for their cooperation. (...)

The abandonment of the appeal means, however, that Malta will remain associated with the 1988 terrorist act when a Pan Am 747 exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland, killing all 259 people on board and 11 locals.

Mr Gauci's testimony was instrumental in convicting Mr Al-Megrahi.

The prosecution's argument was that the bomb left on an Air Malta flight and was eventually transferred to the Pan Am flight via Germany.

Prof Koechler told The Sunday Times he never understood why consecutive administrations in Malta had acted so timidly and done virtually nothing to prevent the country's reputation from being compromised.

"As a member of the United Nations and of the European Union, Malta must demonstrate vis-a-vis the world that it is able and willing to act in the interest of her people... If they are committed to the rule of law, the Maltese authorities should open their own investigation and interrogate Mr Gauci," Prof Koechler said.

He also urged the government to accept a request made to support an international attempt asking the UN to conduct an inquiry into the Lockerbie bombing.

A letter in this regard has been submitted to the President of UN General Assembly signed by a number of people, including families of the victims, renowned authors, politicians and journalists, as well as Archbishop Desmond Tutu - well known for his defence of human rights.

Foreign Affairs Minister Tonio Borg had told The Sunday Times that the government is "considering" the request, but there have been no further developments since.

The letter requesting the government's support was sent to Dr Borg by Robert Black, the Scottish legal expert who was the architect of the Lockerbie trial. He has always spoken out against the original guilty verdict.

His letter to Dr Borg reads: "The signatories to this initiative are of the belief that both the good reputation of Malta and Luqa airport have been quite unjustly stained by association with this affair... We hope that Malta will use its best offices to advance this cause."

The Labour Party believes the government should accept the request. LP spokesman on Foreign Affairs George Vella said he would "not hesitate" to take up the issue in Parliament to push the government to take a stand on the issue.

He gave three reasons for this: the necessity for the truth to emerge, the possibility of establishing the bomb did not leave Malta, and the obligation to the victims' families to identify the real offender. He also stressed such an investigation would have to be sensitive to the victims' families.

Prof Black told The Sunday Times yesterday: "A UN inquiry could remove this wholly unjustified slur on the reputation of Malta, as well as clearing the name of a dying man."

Malta may be cleared of Lockerbie connection

"I firmly believe the bomb did not leave from Malta" - victim's father

The Maltese connection to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie will be called into question with fresh evidence presented in the second appeal of the convicted bomber.

A representative of the British victims' families told The Sunday Times yesterday: "I firmly believe the bomb did not leave from Malta."

The appeal, launched last Tuesday, challenged the testimony of key witness Tony Gauci, a Maltese shopkeeper who had identified Abdel Basset al-Megrahi as having bought clothes from his shop that were later found wrapped around the bomb.

The prosecution's line in the initial trial was that Mr al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent, placed the bomb and clothes in a suitcase checked in at Luqa airport and transferred on to the ill-fated Pan Am flight in Frankfurt.

Ever since Mr al-Megrahi's conviction in 2001, Malta has been implicated in the terrorist act that killed 270 people.

But Mr al-Megrahi's lawyer, Margaret Scott, tore into Mr Gauci's evidence during last Friday's appeal hearing, saying the witness had initially given descriptions of the man in his shop as being taller and more than 10 years older.

"What we have here is a striking discrepancy," she told the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh, according to The Scotsman.

Investigating officers had shown the shopkeeper several photos but he rejected them, because the people were too young. He had even rejected the page showing the photo of Mr al-Megrahi.

But the lawyer told the court last Friday that "unlike before", Mr Gauci was told to look at the photos again. "It was a clear message that there is something there to be found," Dr Scott said.

In fact, Mr Gauci never identified Mr al-Megrahi. He simply stated: "He resembles him a lot."

The trial judges had accepted this identification as a "highly important element" of the case.

Attempts by The Sunday Times to contact Mr Gauci proved futile. During a visit to his Sliema shop yesterday, a man who claimed to be his brother said he had not seen the key witness for a month and insisted he had no comment to make.

Mr al-Megrahi's lawyer will call into question four crucial pieces of evidence that secured his conviction. These are that the accused bought the clothing found with the bomb; that the purchase happened on December 7, 1988; that the buyer knew the purpose for which the clothing was bought; and that the suitcase containing the bomb left from Malta. An element absent from the original trial provides a compelling alternative to the idea that the bomb left from Malta.

Just over 12 years after the bombing, the courts heard retired Heathrow security guard Ray Manly testify that a door leading to the baggage build-up area at Terminal 3 was forced open on the night of December 20, 1988.

The intruder, he had told court, could have easily introduced and tagged a suitcase as Pan Am baggage.

Dr Jim Swire, father of 24-year-old victim Flora, told The Sunday Times yesterday he believed the Malta connection was false: "Security at Luqa conformed to the requirement to check the amount of bags getting on to an aircraft and making sure it agreed with the number that had gone off at the other end."

In the case of the Air Malta flight, which allegedly carried the suitcase with the explosive, "the records show unequivocally that the bags loaded belonged to the passengers and that there were no other bags... and that in Frankfurt the same amount of bags were accounted for."

Dr Swire believed the possibility that the bomb had been planted at Heathrow was suppressed: "Despite this security breach, the airport was not shut down until the breach was explained. Had this been done, I believe my daughter would still be alive." He hoped this second trial would prove to be the watershed he and other sceptical relatives had been waiting for.

However, the appeal may not be concluded if Mr al-Megrahi chooses to return home through a prisoner exchange programme between the UK and Libya, which was ratified by Britain last week.

Mr Al-Megrahi, 57, is suffering from advanced prostate cancer. A decision to drop the appeal would leave him condemned as guilty.

A Scottish journalist following the case told The Sunday Times he suspected that Mr al-Megrahi could be biding his time until this first round of the appeal was over.

"If the judges return with an early verdict in favour of al-Megrahi, he goes back home a free man. If not, he'll likely take the exchange."

Dr Swire was sympathetic to Mr al-Megrahi's position. Although it could mean he would never know the truth about his daughter's death, he said: "Put yourself in his shoes, what else would you do?"

"I would go, and could not blame him if he does. He has told me before that he would rather clear his name before he goes home," Dr Swire added.

But if the appeal did not go through, Dr Swire would be "clamouring" for a full inquiry, which would also be in Malta's interest.

"I think Malta has nothing but substance to gain from this."

[This is an article by Mark Micallef and Caroline Muscat in today's edition of the Maltese newspaper The Sunday Times. As far as I can discover, none of the Scottish or UK Sundays covers the first week of the appeal hearing.]

The Megrahi appeal -- five years ago

What follows is taken from an item posted on this blog five years ago today. I am reasonably confident that relevant fresh news items will be forthcoming within the fairly near future.

[This is an article by Mark Micallef and Caroline Muscat in today's edition of the Maltese newspaper The Sunday Times. As far as I can discover, none of the Scottish or UK Sundays covers the first week of the appeal hearing.]

Malta may be cleared of Lockerbie connection

"I firmly believe the bomb did not leave from Malta" - victim's father

The Maltese connection to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie will be called into question with fresh evidence presented in the second appeal of the convicted bomber.

A representative of the British victims' families told The Sunday Times yesterday: "I firmly believe the bomb did not leave from Malta."

The appeal, launched last Tuesday, challenged the testimony of key witness Tony Gauci, a Maltese shopkeeper who had identified Abdel Basset al-Megrahi as having bought clothes from his shop that were later found wrapped around the bomb.

The prosecution's line in the initial trial was that Mr al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent, placed the bomb and clothes in a suitcase checked in at Luqa airport and transferred on to the ill-fated Pan Am flight in Frankfurt.

Ever since Mr al-Megrahi's conviction in 2001, Malta has been implicated in the terrorist act that killed 270 people.

But Mr al-Megrahi's lawyer, Margaret Scott [now Court of Session and High Court of Justiciary judge, Lady Scott], tore into Mr Gauci's evidence during last Friday's appeal hearing, saying the witness had initially given descriptions of the man in his shop as being taller and more than 10 years older.

"What we have here is a striking discrepancy," she told the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh, according to The Scotsman.

Investigating officers had shown the shopkeeper several photos but he rejected them, because the people were too young. He had even rejected the page showing the photo of Mr al-Megrahi.

But the lawyer told the court last Friday that "unlike before", Mr Gauci was told to look at the photos again. "It was a clear message that there is something there to be found," [Ms] Scott said.

In fact, Mr Gauci never identified Mr al-Megrahi. He simply stated: "He resembles him a lot."

The trial judges had accepted this identification as a "highly important element" of the case.

Attempts by The Sunday Times to contact Mr Gauci proved futile. During a visit to his Sliema shop yesterday, a man who claimed to be his brother said he had not seen the key witness for a month and insisted he had no comment to make.

Mr al-Megrahi's lawyer will call into question four crucial pieces of evidence that secured his conviction. These are that the accused bought the clothing found with the bomb; that the purchase happened on December 7, 1988; that the buyer knew the purpose for which the clothing was bought; and that the suitcase containing the bomb left from Malta. An element absent from the original trial provides a compelling alternative to the idea that the bomb left from Malta.

Just over 12 years after the bombing, the courts heard retired Heathrow security guard Ray Manly testify that a door leading to the baggage build-up area at Terminal 3 was forced open on the night of December 20, 1988.

The intruder, he had told court, could have easily introduced and tagged a suitcase as Pan Am baggage.

Dr Jim Swire, father of 24-year-old victim Flora, told The Sunday Times yesterday he believed the Malta connection was false: "Security at Luqa conformed to the requirement to check the amount of bags getting on to an aircraft and making sure it agreed with the number that had gone off at the other end."

In the case of the Air Malta flight, which allegedly carried the suitcase with the explosive, "the records show unequivocally that the bags loaded belonged to the passengers and that there were no other bags... and that in Frankfurt the same amount of bags were accounted for."

Dr Swire believed the possibility that the bomb had been planted at Heathrow was suppressed: "Despite this security breach, the airport was not shut down until the breach was explained. Had this been done, I believe my daughter would still be alive." He hoped this second trial would prove to be the watershed he and other sceptical relatives had been waiting for.

However, the appeal may not be concluded if Mr al-Megrahi chooses to return home through a prisoner exchange programme between the UK and Libya, which was ratified by Britain last week.

Mr Al-Megrahi, 57, is suffering from advanced prostate cancer. A decision to drop the appeal would leave him condemned as guilty.

A Scottish journalist following the case told The Sunday Times he suspected that Mr al-Megrahi could be biding his time until this first round of the appeal was over.

"If the judges return with an early verdict in favour of al-Megrahi, he goes back home a free man. If not, he'll likely take the exchange."

Dr Swire was sympathetic to Mr al-Megrahi's position. Although it could mean he would never know the truth about his daughter's death, he said: "Put yourself in his shoes, what else would you do?"

"I would go, and could not blame him if he does. He has told me before that he would rather clear his name before he goes home," Dr Swire added.

But if the appeal did not go through, Dr Swire would be "clamouring" for a full inquiry, which would also be in Malta's interest.

"I think Malta has nothing but substance to gain from this."

A Maltese perspective

[The Malta Independent on Sunday carries an article and an editorial on what should happen now that Abdelbaset Megrahi has returned to Libya after abandoning his appeal (in which one of the issues would have been whether the trial court was entitled to conclude that the suitcase containing the bomb was ingested at Luqa Airport in Malta). The article reads as follows:]

Lockerbie case expert Professor Robert Black has added his name to a growing school of thought that prescribes Malta should demand a separate enquiry into the Lockerbie bombing so as to clear its name as the bomb’s point of departure.

Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, the only person to have been found guilty of the 1988 terrorist attack that brought down a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland – killing 270 people in the process – was freed from a Scottish prison on Thursday on compassionate grounds, a move allowed under Scottish law for terminally ill prisoners.

But before his release and his subsequent return to Libya was approved, Mr al-Megrahi had dropped an upcoming appeal against his conviction – an appeal that he himself as well as many observers felt he would have won, had it been heard.

But now that the appeal has been dropped, it appears increasingly likely that the victims’ families will never know the truth behind the attack, nor could Malta expect to have its name cleared as the bomb’s staging post.

Contacted by The Malta Independent on Sunday, Professor Black, a former Scottish judge and the architect of the original Lockerbie trial, stressed his conviction that Malta should be demanding a separate enquiry into the bombing so as to remove the blemish on the country and its airport security. Such an enquiry, he suggests, could be carried out by the European Union at Malta’s behest.

“I think the Maltese government should be pressing very hard within the EU for an enquiry into Lockerbie,” Professor Black comments.

“The evidence that the bomb started out its fatal progress from Luqa Airport was some of the weakest in the Zeist trial but it was swallowed by the judges – it had to be, if they were going to convict Megrahi.

“The evidence established that security and baggage reconciliation systems at the airport were of a high international standard – much higher than those then operative at Heathrow. Yet the judges, on the flimsiest of evidence – a dubious interpretation of a computer print-out from Frankfurt Airport – held that Malta was the point of ingestion.

“This unwarranted slur on Maltese airport security should not be allowed to remain. I would strongly encourage the Government of Malta to take such steps as membership of the EU accords it to have this stigma removed.”

Mr al-Megrahi’s appeal had been granted after the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission found the reliability of Maltese evidence used to convict the former Libyan intelligence agent of carrying out as highly questionable and recommended he be granted an appeal.

Professor Black, himself from Lockerbie, had drawn up the framework for al-Megrahi’s trial, held in the Netherlands under Scottish law, which led to his conviction in 2001. Since then, Professor Black has continually criticised the court’s verdict, contending that al-Megrahi was innocent and that Malta was not the bomb’s point of departure.

[The editorial headed "The appeal that should have been heard" reads in part:]

Now that the appeal lodged by the convicted Lockerbie bomber has been dropped once and for all, the families of the 270 victims of what was the worst terrorist attack in history on British soil stand a very good chance of never knowing how, why and by whom their loved ones were taken from them so tragically just four days before Christmas in 1988.

Nor will Malta’s name ever be cleared by a court of law over its apparent role, as the bomb’s point of departure, in the tragedy. The country has been dogged over the last 21 years by the Lockerbie prosecution’s contention that the bomb that brought down Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland on 21 December 1988 began its deadly journey on an Air Malta flight out of Luqa Airport.

Indeed, the only hope of answers for the families on both sides of the Atlantic, which incidentally hold very different views on the guilt of the convicted bomber, of learning the truth lies in the possibility of a separate enquiry into the case.

Malta would also have much to gain from such an enquiry – having been branded as the place where the bomb began its travels, and with both underlying and outright implications of lax airport security and the country’s association, however distant, with such a heinous act of terrorism.

As one of the Lockerbie case’s leading authorities points out in today’s issue, the evidence presented during the trial that the bomb had originated at Luqa Airport was some of the weakest of the entire proceedings, and Malta has a good case to bring to the European Union for such an enquiry.

Malta also deserves some concrete answers about its role in the tragedy, and it should be lobbying at all levels for an investigation that would, albeit outside a court of law, at least hear out the new evidence and arguments that were to have been presented by the defence team at the appeal, which mainly dealt with the weaknesses in the Maltese testimony that led to the conviction.

Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, a former employee with Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta and the only person to have been found guilty of the terrorist attack, was convicted largely on the basis of evidence supplied by Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci – of the now infamous Mary’s House on Tower Road, Sliema.

In his evidence, Mr Gauci identified Mr al-Megrahi as the purchaser of articles of clothing and an umbrella found in the suitcase containing the bomb – placed on an Air Malta flight and transferred to the ill-fated Pan Am flight in Frankfurt.

But in reviewing the request for an appeal, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission found “there is no reasonable basis in the trial court’s judgment for its conclusion that the purchase of the items from Mary’s House, took place on 7 December 1988” – the very argument that had sealed the indictment against Mr al-Megrahi.

In recommending that the appeal be heard, the Commission found that although it had been proven that Mr al-Megrahi had been in Malta on several occasions during the month in question, it was determined through the new evidence submitted that 7 December 1988 was the only date on which he would have had the opportunity to make the purchases from Mary’s House.

The evidence that was not heard at the trial concerned the date on which Christmas lights had been illuminated in Sliema near Mary’s House which, taken together with Mr Gauci’s evidence at trial and the contents of his police statements, indicates the purchase of the incriminating items had taken place before 6 December 1988 – when no evidence had been presented at trial to the effect that Mr al-Megrahi was in Malta before 6 December. (...)

Mr al-Megrahi’s lawyers have also claimed that Mr Gauci had given contradictory evidence, including differing dates of purchase and his account of the sale itself, and that, on one occasion, he had even identified Palestinian terrorist leader Abu Talb as the purchaser.

And then there are the other allegation made by Mr al-Megrahi’s defence team that Scottish detectives had coached Mr Gauci on at least 23 occasions, sometimes over alleged fishing trips on the Scottish lochs, and that he also received up to US$2 million in return for his testimony.

A delegation from the Scottish Crown was also due to travel to Malta to seek consent for the disclosure of sensitive documents related to the case, specifically statements given to the police in September 1989 by a friend of Mr Gauci attesting the former’s concern that Mr Gauci had identified the wrong man – evidence the defence team had argued could have exonerated their client but which had never been presented in court or handed over to the defence team.

Mr Gauci’s friend had apparently raised concerns over the fact that he made a transaction at the shop that bore a remarkable resemblance to the sale to the two men Mr Gauci described in his testimony.

There are so many questions about the case that are still lingering or, rather, festering, that one questions whether the truth behind the Lockerbie bombing will ever be known.

Perhaps it is up to Malta, which has found itself right in the middle of the controversy for over two decades now and through no fault of its own, to find a way to force that truth to come out.

[The Sunday Times of Malta publishes an article headed "Malta had 'no connection' with Lockerbie bomb - government". It contains the following:]

Malta had "no connection" with the bomb that exploded aboard an aircraft over Lockerbie in 1988, Deputy Prime Minister Tonio Borg told The Sunday Times yesterday.

"The position of the government has never changed on this matter - Malta was not involved in this incident. The bomb never left from Malta," Dr Borg said in the first government reaction since the controversial release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi. (...)

But Dr Borg said that the withdrawal by Mr Al-Megrahi of the second appeal before the Scottish courts meant that no new light could now be shed on the incident.

Asked if he believed Mr Al-Megrahi was innocent, the Foreign Minister said: "The Scottish [Criminal Cases] Review [Commission] said there were sufficient grounds which could have led to the reopening of the case. Unfortunately this hasn't happened."

British MPs, activist say Malta should defend itself on Lockerbie case

[This is the headline over an article by Caroline Muscat in today's edition of the Maltese newspaper The Sunday Times. It reads in part:]

Two former British Labour and Conservative MPs have joined American political activist Noam Chomsky in calling on the Maltese government to defend the country's reputation.

Prof Chomsky and the British MPs are signatories to a letter sent to the government calling on Malta to support a demand for an inquiry by the UN General Assembly into the 1988 Pan Am bombing that claimed 270 lives.

The letter sent by the 'Justice for Megrahi' campaign, which includes relatives of the victims in the bombing, is also signed by South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for 43 years, and Teddy Taylor, MP for the Conservatives for 36 years, said they had doubts about the original verdict. They said if the Maltese government supported a UN inquiry, then it could clear the country's name and help the families of the victims establish the truth.

Prof Chomsky described the events surrounding the case of the convicted bomber Abdelbasset Al Megrahi as "a remarkable illustration of the conformism and obedience of intellectual opinion in the West".

He told The Sunday Times: "I think the trial was very seriously flawed, including crucially the alleged role of Malta. There is every reason to call for a very serious independent inquiry." (...)

The original conviction of Mr Al Megrahi had relied heavily on the testimony of Tony Gauci, the owner of a shop in Sliema who said the Libyan had bought clothes from his shop that were later found wrapped around the bomb.

But it has since emerged that Al Megrahi's defence team had argued in the recent appeal that the Maltese witness was paid "in excess of $2 million", while his brother Paul Gauci was paid "in excess of $1 million" for their co-operation. Neither has ever denied receiving payment.

The former British Conservative MP referred to Mr Gauci's testimony when speaking to The Sunday Times. He said if "our friends in Malta" were willing to pursue the issue at the UN and seek the truth that may have been flawed by "a statement of a resident of Malta who appears to have benefited enormously from his identification and who then moved to Australia", then the government would help relatives of the victims, and itself.

Mr Taylor recalled Malta's role in the Second World War, saying "British people my age have a very special regard for Malta as a centre of brave and trustworthy people who were willing to stand firm against fascism".

Mr Dalyell said: "I have believed since 1991 that the Crown Office in Edinburgh should have respected the stated view of the Maltese government, Air Malta, Luqa airport authorities and the Malta police that no unaccounted for luggage, let alone a bomb, was placed on the flight."

Although Malta has always denied any involvement in the act, it remains implicated by the government's refusal to take up the cause.

When Mr Gauci said in the original trial that he believed Mr Al Megrahi purchased clothes from his shop, it provided the prosecution with grounds to argue that the bomb had left from Malta and then transferred to the fateful flight.

Malta had provided ample evidence to support its contention that there was no unaccompanied luggage on Air Malta flight KM180 on December 21, 1988. But Malta's defence was trumped by Mr Gauci's testimony.

Lockerbie bomb did not leave Malta, Justice Minister insists

[This is the headline over a report in yesterday's edition of the Maltese newspaper The Times.  It reads in part:]

Malta would continue to stick to its long-held stand that the Lockerbie bomb did not leave from Luqa airport, Justice Minister Chris Said has insisted.

“Since 1988, successive governments have insisted that, according to our records, the bomb did not leave Malta. We are still firm in that conviction,” Dr Said told The Times in view of fresh evidence released by the Scottish authorities.

However, the government does not seem to be interested in petitioning the Scottish auth­orities to re-open the Lockerbie investigation “at least to clear Malta’s name”, as requested by Labour foreign affairs spokesman George Vella.

Dr Said skirted the issue when asked but added: “We cannot ignore that there were two judgements on (Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi). The fact that the second appeal was initiated does show that doubts persist on the verdicts. Unfortunately, it was not concluded.”

A report by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission that was made public this week established that Mr Megrahi, the man convicted of the bombing, may have suffered a miscarriage of justice.

It also shed doubt on the credibility of a key Maltese witness, Sliema shopkeeper Tony Gauci, who had identified Mr Megrahi as the man he sold clothes to. Fragments of the clothes were found in the remains of the suitcase that contained the bomb.

The Scottish commission had initiated its investigation that laid the groundwork for a review of Mr Megrahi’s appeal but the matter never went beyond the extensive report because the Libyan national was released from jail – where he was serving life – on compassionate grounds in 2009.

Investigators had argued that an unaccompanied suitcase carrying the bomb and containing clothing bought from Mr Gauci’s shop was placed on board an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, where it eventually made it to Heath­row before being loaded onto the fatal Pan-Am flight 103.

[A report in Thursday's edition of the same newspaper contains the following:]

As fresh evidence emerges on the Lockerbie bombing that sheds serious doubt on Malta’s link, Labour foreign affairs spokesman George Vella has urged the government to petition the Scottish authorities to reopen the investigation.

“The government should petition the Scottish authorities to reopen the Lockerbie investigation, at least to clear Malta’s name,” Dr Vella said when contacted yesterday, adding the report continued to confirm serious concerns raised over the past years over the guilty verdict.

But according to lawyer Giannella de Marco, who formed part of Mr Megrahi’s defence team at the time, Malta had nothing to clear because it was never accused of helping terrorists.

Investigators had argued that an unaccompanied suitcase carrying the bomb and containing clothing bought from a Sliema shop was placed on board an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, where it eventually made it to Heathrow before being loaded onto the fatal Pan-Am flight 103. The aircraft exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie killing 270 people.

Dr Vella expressed serious concern on the report’s assertion that a key Maltese witness was paid for providing incriminating evidence that led to Mr Megrahi’s conviction. The review commission shed serious doubt on the credibility of Tony Gauci, the Sliema shopkeeper who is supposed to have sold the clothes found in the suitcase to Mr Megrahi.

Mr Gauci, the report said, had also been paid by the US State Department for the important evidence he gave during the trial when identifying Mr Megrahi as “the Libyan” who bought clothes from his shop, Mary’s House, in December 1988.

“It shocks me to know that for money some people will be ready to send someone to jail,” Dr Vella said.

There were big international interests involved, he added, especially if it were true that “evidence was planted and witnesses paid to confirm the story that was created”.

Doubts over Mr Megrahi’s guilty verdict in 2001 have long been cast, especially by British doctor Jim Swire, who lost his daughter in the terrorist attack.

Dr Swire has long believed Mr Megrahi is innocent and that Malta could not have been involved in any way. It is a sentiment shared by Dr de Marco.

She always had a suspicion that Mr Gauci was paid because his version and description of the man who supposedly bought clothes from his shop changed many times.

“By time, the description of the man Gauci sold the clothes to, which initially did not resemble Megrahi, grew to resemble him and I am glad that the Scottish review commission has seen his testimony for what it is,” she said.

Dr de Marco does not agree with those who argued Malta had to clear its name. She insisted there was never any conclusive evidence that the bomb had left from Malta and in no way was the country ever accused of aiding terrorists.

“On the contrary, Malta had helped investigators in all ways possible so the truth could emerge,” she said.

Pan Am 103 case: A study in propaganda service

[This is part of the headline over a long article by Professor Emeritus Edward S Herman of the University of Pennsylvania that was published on the Global Research website on this date in 2007. It reads as follows:]

New York Times propaganda service has often been dramatically displayed in connection with the shooting down of civilian airliners. The editors were hysterical over the Soviet shooting down of Korean airliner 007 on August 31, 1983: 270 articles and 2,789 column inches during September 1983 alone, along with an editorial designation of the incident as “cold-blooded mass murder.” The paper took as truth the official and party line that the Soviets knew they were shooting down a civilian airliner. Several years later the editors acknowledged that their assumption had been wrong, but they blamed this on the government, not their own gullibility (ed, The Lie That Wasn’t Shot Down, Jan 18, 1988). It had done no investigative work on the case in the interim, and the lie was shot down based on information developed outside the media.

In a markedly contrasting response, when Israel shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai desert in February 1973, although in this case there was no question but that the Israelis knew they were downing a civilian airliner, the New York Times covered the incident much less intensively and without expressing the slightest indignation, let alone using words like “cold-blooded” or “murder.”

Equally interesting, the paper recognized the political importance of their treatment of each of these events: in the Soviet case, in a year-later retrospective, Times reporter Bernard Gwertzman wrote that US officials “assert that worldwide criticism of the Soviet handling of the crisis has strengthened the United States in its relations with Moscow.” With the orchestrated intense and indignant coverage of this shootdown the Soviets had suffered not only harsh criticism but boycotts for its action. By contrast, Israel suffered not the slightest damage. The New York Times editorialized that “No useful purpose is served by an acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame for the downing of a Libyan plane in the Sinai peninsula last week” (ed, March 1, 1973). Within a week of the shootdown, the Israeli Prime Minister was welcomed in Washington without incident or intrusive questions. In short, blame and debate is a function of utility, which is to say, political advantage. Where it helps, as in putting the Soviets in a bad light, we support assigning blame, indignation and debate; where it would injure a client, “no useful purpose” would be served by such treatment. And somehow the UN and “international community” react in ways that conform to what the US government and New York Times perceive as useful.

In the case of Pan Am 103, the political aspect of assigning blame has been clearly and, arguably, overwhelmingly important. The plane was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, with 270 plane casualties (and 11 persons killed on the ground). This followed by only five and a half months the US navy’s shooting down of Iranian airliner 655 in July 1988, killing 290, mainly Iranian pilgrims. The link between the two events was quickly seen, and the likelihood that the later event was an act of vengeance by Iran was a working hypothesis, supported further by an unproven claim of Western security forces that Iran had offered a $10 million reward for a retaliatory act. As the case developed it was soon a consensus of investigators that the Pan Am action had been the work of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) under the leadership of Ahmed Jibral, based in Syria, and responding to the Iranian offer.

But then, as relations with Saddam Hussein deteriorated in 1989 and 1990, and the United States sought better relations with Syria and Iran in the run-up to the first Persian Gulf War, Western officials became quiet on the Syria-Iran connection, followed by a fairly rapid shift from “definitive” proof of PFLP-Syrian-Iranian involvement to “definitive” proof that it was a Libyan act. As Paul Foot noted, “The evidence against the PFLP which had been so carefully put together and was so immensely impressive was quietly but firmly junked” (Lockerbie: The Flight From Justice, Private Eye, May/June 2001, p 10). Libya provided a suitable new culprit, as it was already on the U.S.-UK hit list and had been subjected to a series of efforts at “regime change,” a hostility based on its independence, support of the Palestinians and other dissident forces (including the ANC and Mandela in their resistance to the apartheid regime), as well as occasional support of anti-Western terrorists. So Libya it was.

The Libyan connection lasted in pristine condition from 1990 into 2007, during which time Libya was subjected to intensive vilification, costly sanctions imposed by the Security Council, and a highly publicized trial in Scotland that resulted in the conviction of a Libyan national for the Lockerbie murders, with further bad publicity for Libya and Kaddafi, and a payment of several billion dollars in victim compensation that Libya felt compelled to provide (although still denying any involvement in the shootdown). All this despite the fact that many experts and observers, including some victim family members, felt that the trial was a political event and a judicial farce that yielded an unwarranted and unjust conviction.

This belief in the injustice of the court decision was greatly strengthened in June 2007 when a Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission issued a decision that found the 2001 trial and decision flawed and opened the way for a fresh appeal for the convicted Libyan. If this decision is validated, the world will be left without a party responsible for the Pan Am-103 bombing, but with the strong likelihood that attention will be refocused on the PFLP and its sponsors, Syria and Iran. Is it not an amazing coincidence that this second turnaround occurs as Libya becomes more acceptable to the United States and its allies and these Western powers are now retargeting Syria and Iran?

We should note one other set of facts in this controversy that bears on the quality of “international justice.” That is, the treatment by the United States, New York Times, and international community of the shooting down of the Iranian airliner 655 by the US warship Vincennes in July 1988 and the process of bringing justice to the families of the victims of that act. It is true that this was not a planned destruction of an airliner, but it was carried out by a U.S. naval commander noted for his “Rambo” qualities and the civilian airliner destroyed was closely following its assigned air space (in contrast with 007). A point rarely mentioned in the U.S. media is that the U.S. naval vessel that shot the plane down was on a mission in aid of Saddam Hussein in his war of aggression against Iran.

The Reagan administration did express “deep regret” at the incident, although blaming Iran for hostile actions that provoked the U.S. action (which were later shown to have been non-existent) and for failing to terminate its war against Iraq–and as the United States was supporting Iraq, by definition Iran was the aggressor. It also paid some $132 million as compensation, including $62 million for the families of the victims. This is, of course, substantially less than Kaddafi felt obligated to pay the victims of Pan Am 103, the ratio of payments to the respective victims being roughly 30 to 1.

The New York Times, which had had an editorial entitled “Murder” in connection with the 007 shootdown, asserted back in 1983 that “There is no conceivable excuse for any nation shooting down a harmless airliner,” but it predictably found one for the 655 case: “the incident must still be seen as not as a crime [let alone “murder”] but as a blunder, and a tragedy.” Neither the UN Security Council nor International Civil Aviation Organization condemned the United States for this action, although both had done so as regards the Soviet Union in the case of Korean airliner 007, and of course the Security Council would eventually take severe action against Libya in regard to Pan Am 103. There was no punishment whatsoever meted out to Rambo Captain Will Rogers, who got a “hero’s welcome” upon his return to San Diego five months after the shoot-down (Robert Reinhold, Crew of Cruiser That Downed Iranian Airliner Gets a Warm Homecoming, NYT, Oct 25, 1988), and was subsequently awarded a Legion of Merit award for “exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service.” The Iranians were naturally angry at this reception and treatment of the man responsible for killing 290 mainly Iranian civilians, and were possibly a bit resentful at the workings of the system of international justice as it impacted them.

Polls indicated that the warm greeting Rogers got in San Diego was not an aberration—the public was pleased with his accomplishment. This reflected the fact that media coverage of the 655 shootdown had focused on official claims about the reason for the deadly act, not the plight of the victims and the grief of their families—which was the heavy and continuing focus of attention in both the 007 and Pan Am 103 cases. The alleged suffering of Captain Rogers got more attention than that of the 290 victims and their families. We are back to the contrast between “worthy” and “unworthy” victims, and the “useful purpose” of the focus of attention, as seen by the U.S. establishment and media.

One further note on international justice concerns the treatment of the US bombing of Libya on April 14, 1986. That attack followed by little more than a week the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin that was quickly blamed by the Reagan administration on Libya, though proof of this connection was never forthcoming. The US bombing attack targeted Kadaffi’s residence, and, while failing to assassinate him, killed his young daughter along with 40 or more Libyan civilians. This was an act of state terrorism and a straightforward violation of the UN Charter, but here again a US (along with supportive British and French) veto prevented any UN Security Council condemnation, let alone other action, in response to this terrorism. The UN can act only when the United States wants it to act; it can never do anything in response to US or US client state violence, no matter how egregious. And the case of Libya and Pan Am 103 affords strong evidence that when the United States wants the UN to act against a target, serious penalties and other forms of damage can be inflicted that are based on false charges and a corrupted legal process (as described below).

We may note also that the New York Times editors were delighted with the 1986 terroristic attack on Libya. Their editorial on the subject stated that “The smoke in Tripoli has barely cleared, yet on the basis of early information even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya” (ed, The Terrorist and His Sentence, April 15, 1986), The “early information” showed only that while the assassination attempt had failed scores of what the editors would call “innocent civilians” in a reverse context were killed. Thus once again the editors expose their belief that international law does not apply to the United States, and it demonstrates once again that civilians killed by the US government are “unworthy” victims whose deaths the editors can literally applaud.

As in the case of the shooting down of 007, on November 14, 1999 the New York Times had big headlines and lavished a great deal of attention and indignation on the US-British indictment of two Libyans alleged to have been the bombers of Pan Am 103, and it provided similar headlines, attention and indignation when the Scottish court found one of the two Libyans guilty on January 31, 2001. By contrast, the report that the Scottish Review Court had found the trial of the Libyans badly flawed and suggested that justice called for a new trial, was given no editorial attention and a single question-begging article (Alan Cowell, Lockerbie Ruling Raises Questions On Libyan’s Guilt, June 29, 2007).

At no time did any of the 15 Times editorials on the Pan Am 103 shootdown and Libya connection express the slightest reservation about the process or substance of the charges against the Libyans. As regards the politics of the case, with the seemingly strong case involving the PLP, Syria and Iran abandoned just when the United States was briefly cozying up to Syria and Iran, shifting to the continuing target Libya, the editors did refer to “cynics” who thought the administration “finds it convenient to downplay Syria’s dreadful record now that Damascus has joined Middle East peace negotiations” (ed, “Seeking the Truth About Libya,” March 30, 1992), but the editors refused to accept this cynical notion and, most important, it didn’t cause them to examine the evidence against Libya more closely. This was their government, Libya was a villain, and patriotism and built-in bias kept their blinders firmly in place.

As regards legal process, following the US-Scottish charges against the two Libyans, Libya immediately arrested the two suspects and started a judicial investigation, which followed precisely the requirements of the 1971 Montreal Convention dealing with acts of violence involving civil aviation. Libya promised to try the two men if evidence was supplied it, and it offered to allow observers and requested international assistance in gathering evidence. The United States and Britain rejected this on the ground that Libya would never convict its own, although if the trial was flawed they could have demanded action from the World Court. An exceptional Times op-ed column by Marc Weller argued that what Libya did was in accord with international law and that the US-UK action was not only illegal but also abused and politicized the Security Council (“Libyan Terrorism, American Vigilantism” Feb 15, 1992).

The Times’ editors ignored the Weller argument: as always, for the editors international law doesn’t apply to the United States. Also, it was clear to them that Libya could not be trusted to try its own—just as it never occurred to them that a trial of Libyans in the West could be anything but justice in action, even though the advance publicity by Western officials, once again demonizing the alleged villains and alleging “irrefutable evidence,” put great pressure on judges and juries and made a fair trial problematic.

A standard form of propagandistic journalism is to provide “balance” by citing on the “other side” the villains and their sponsors rather than independent critics. In past years the New York Times regularly cited Soviet officials for balance, rather than dissident US citizens who would have had more credibility with US audiences. In the Libya-Pan Am 103 case, the Times regularly cited Kaddaffi (“ranting”) and other Libyans as charging political bias in the proceedings, while neglecting Westerners with more authority. Most notorious, the Times has yet to cite Dr. Hans Köchler, [an Austrian] legal scholar who was Kofi Annan’s appointed observer at the trial of the two Libyans in the Netherlands (Camp Zeist) under Scottish law. Köchler produced a powerful Report and Evaluation of the Lockerbie Trial in February 2001 that was widely reported and featured in the Scottish and other European media, but was never once mentioned by the Times in its news or editorials. The other expert almost entirely ignored by the Times was Professor Robert Black, a Scottish legal authority who was an important contributor to the arrangements for the trial at Zeist, who followed it closely, and was immensely knowledgeable on both the trial and Scottish law. Black was mentioned briefly twice in Times news articles, but never in an editorial. It can hardly be a coincidence that the ignoring of Köchler and marginalizing of Black paralleled their finding the trial a travesty, badly politicized (Kochler) and with a judicial decision unsupported by credible evidence (Black [“a fraud”] and Kochler).

The Times has repeatedly claimed that the case against the Libyans resulted from a model police effort—they used the phrase “meticulous British and American police work” more than once—and it was allegedly supported by “hundreds of witnesses” and “thousands of bits of evidence.” Thus, while the trial never yielded a smoking gun, it provided compelling “circumstantial evidence.” At no point does the paper acknowledge any possible mismanagement or corruption in the collection and processing of evidence. Among the points never mentioned are that:

Not only “police” but the US CIA and other personnel were on the crash scene on December 21, 1988 within two hours of the disaster, moving about freely, removing and possibly altering evidence in violation of the rules of dealing with crash-scene evidence, and over-riding the supposed authority of the Scottish police (for details, John Ashton and Ian Ferguson, Cover-Up of Convenience, chapter 12, “’An Old-Fashioned Police Investigation’”). Presumably, for the Times, just as international law doesn’t apply to the United States, neither do the rules of proper assembling of evidence.

The key piece of evidence, a fragment from a timer, was first marked “cloth, charred,” but was later overwritten with the word “debris,” a change never adequately explained. Some months later, upon examination by UK forensic expert Thomas Hayes, a note about this fragment was written by him, but the page numbers were subsequently overwritten and renumbered, again without explanation. Months later, marks on the timer were allegedly identified with MEBO, a Swiss firm that manufactured timers, and one that did business with Libya. This was “conclusive evidence,” although MEBO also sold the timers to East Germany, Libya might have provided the timer to others, MEBO had reported several break-ins at its factory to the Swiss police between October 1988 and February 1989. Furthermore, when finally shown the fragment MEBO’s owner said it was a different color from his own, and it turned out that the CIA had this very timer in its possession.

All three forensic scientists who worked intensively on this case, one for the FBI (Tom Thurman) and two for a branch of the UK ministry of defense (Allen Feraday and Thomas Hayes) had run into trouble in the past for concealment of evidence (Hayes), wrong conclusions (in one case, false testimony on a explosive timer—Feraday), and fabrication of evidence (Tom Thurman). (See Foot, op cit, App 2, “The Three Forensic Geniuses.”)

The CIA had a major role in creating the case, their primary witness being the Libyan defector Majid Giaka. The CIA offered him to the prosecution even though years ago they had decided that he was a liar and con man. Giaka had said nothing about any Libyan connection to the Pan Am bombing for months after it took place, and he came through only when threatened with a funds cutoff. Paul Foot asks ” Why was such an obviously corrupt and desperate liar produced by the prosecution at all?” It is also testimony to the quality of the legal process that for a while the CIA refused to produce cables and e-mail messages regarding Giaka, arguing that they were irrelevant. When finally reluctantly produced they were not irrelevant, but showed the CIA’s own low opinion of Giaka. The Times did have a news article or two that described Giaka’s poor record and malperformance on the stand, but none of the 15 editorials mentioned him or allowed this phase of the proceeding to limit their admiration for police and prosecution.

Neither the US nor UK governments nor the Zeist court was willing to explore alternative models, several of which were more plausible than the one involving Libya. The one already mentioned, featuring the PFLP-Syria-Iran connection, was compelling: PFLP’s German members were found in possession of radio cassettes and workable timers; they had already used these in bombing attacks; they were known to have cased the Frankfurt airport just before the day of the bombing; one of their operatives had visited Malta and the shopkeeper who sold the clothes found in the Pan Am-103 debris first identified this individual (Abu Talb) as the purchaser; and there was evidence of this group’s link to Iran and claims of a paid contract, among other points.

In a related scenario, the bomb was introduced by the PFLP into the suitcase of Khalid Jaafar, an agent in a drug-running operation, protected by the CIA as part of its hostage-release program. The CIA involvement in this drug-running operation may have been one reason for the hasty and aggressive CIA takeover of the search at the crash site; and it, and the closely related desire to avoid disturbing negotiations with Syrian and Iranian terrorists holding Western hostages, may also help explain why President Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher apparently agreed in March 1989 to prevent any uncontrolled investigation of the bombing.

Not only were these governments unwilling to look at alternatives, they actually blocked other inquiries and pursued and tried to damage individuals who did so (see Ashton and Ferguson, Cover-Up, chap 8, “The Knives Come Out”). The Zeist court conformed to this program, with the result that actors for whom the “circumstantial evidence” was far more compelling than in the case of the Libyans were excluded from consideration.

The Times found the original US-British charges and the Scottish court’s decision satisfying, although based only on “circumstantial evidence.” They provided no serious analysis of this evidence, and both Robert Black and Hans Köchler, among many others, found the evidence completely inadequate to sustain a conviction except in a court where a conviction was a political necessity. Consider the following:

Although the case was built on the argument that the two Libyans carried out the operation together as a team, only one was convicted. As Köchler said: “This is totally incomprehensible for any rational observer when one considers that the indictment in its very essence was based on the joint action of the two accused in Malta.” This result can best be explained by the need to have somebody found guilty.

There is no evidence that the convicted Libyan, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi, put a suitcase on the connecting flight from Malta to Frankfurt, where it was supposedly transferred to Pan Am 103. Air Malta is notable for its close checking of baggage, and when UK’s Granada Television claimed that the death bag had gone through it to Pan Am 103, Air Malta sued. Its evidence that only 55 bags with ascribed passengers—none of whom went on to London–were on that flight was so compelling that Granada settled out-of-court, paying damages and costs. This of course never made it into the New York Times, and had little effect on the Zeist court, which eventually said that how the unaccompanied bag was put on the plane “is a major difficulty for the Crown case,” but it didn’t interfere with the finding of guilt.

The identification of al-Megrahi as the Malta purchaser of the clothing whose remnants were found in the wreckage was a travesty of judicial procedure. The selling storekeeper, Tony Gauci, originally said the buyer was six feet tall and 50 or more years old—al-Megrahi is 5-8 and was 37 years old in 1988. Gauci then identified Talb as the man, but eventually latched on to al-Megrahi after having seen his picture in the paper. There were many other weaknesses in this identification, including the timing of the purchase, so that like the disposition of the suitcase this also was another beyond-tenuous “circumstantial.”

The logic of the official scenario also suffers from the fact that putting a bomb-laden bag through from Malta that had to go through a second inspection and two stopovers in the delay-frequent Christmas season, would be poor planning as it risked either apprehension or a badly timed explosion; and including clothing that could be traced to Malta and with the alleged bomber (al-Megrahi) making his purchase openly would be extremely unprofessional. On the other hand, a timer frequently used by the PFLP was estimated by a German expert to explode 38 minutes after takeoff, and Pan Am 103 exploded 38 minutes after takeoff.

As noted earlier, the timer with the MEBO insignia came forth belatedly. It was gathered in a crash scene effort that violated all the rules and was then worked over in questionable circumstances by people who had an established record of creating and massaging evidence. These lags and problematics should have ruled out the acceptance of this evidence in a criminal trial by a non-political court. But even taking it at face value it fails to prove Libyan involvement in the bombing attack as this timer was available to others, and may have been stolen from the MEBO factory in the 1988-1989 break-ins.

The Times notes that “prosecutors credibly linked him [al-Megrahi] to bomb-making materials and presented persuasive testimony that he worked for Libya’s intelligence services.” Yes, this goes beyond his Libyan.citizenship, and the man was also sometimes in Malta! Imagine how the Times would treat an accusation against a CIA agent based on the fact that the accused had “access to weapons” and was in fact a member of the CIA! The Times doesn’t ask for much in the way of “evidence” when in the patriotic mode.

In its low-keyed news article on the Scottish Review Commission’s repudiation of the Zeist court’s decision ( “Lockerbie Ruling Raises Questions on Libyan’s Guilt,” June 29, 2007), Times reporter Alan Cowell does a creditable job of protecting his paper for failing to question another “lie that wasn’t shot down.” The Review Commission apparently leaned over backwards to avoid charging the Zeist court with judicial malpractice, so Cowell latches on to the fact that the Review stresses “new evidence that we have found and new evidence that was not before the trial court,” as well as their denial that there was proof of fabricated evidence. But much of that new evidence was deliberately excluded by the trial court, and some of it was hidden by the prosecution and its US and UK political and intelligence sponsors. And while there is perhaps no hard proof of fabricated evidence, there is solid documentation of its questionable handling and possible fabrication, which should have precluded its acceptance by the trial court.

Instead of citing Hans Kochler or Robert Black, Cowell quotes Dan Cohen, whose daughter went down with Pan Am 103, who expresses regret that al-Megrahi might go home a hero. Possibly more honorable would have been a Times apology and expression of sympathy for the Libyan victim, who will have spent 6 or 7 years in prison on the basis of manipulated and laughable evidence in another show trial, but which the Times repeatedly claimed was justice in action.

In her 1993 memoir The Downing Street Years, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote that after the 1986 US bombing of Libya, which used British airbases and in which Kaddaffi’s two-year old daughter was killed, “There were revenge killings of British hostages organized by Libya, which I deeply regretted. But the much vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not and could not take place.” Ms Thatcher seems to have forgotten Pan Am 103, or could she have momentarily forgotten that Libya was supposed to have been guilty of this act, and, writing honestly but carelessly for the historical record implicitly acknowledged here that this was a fraud that she had helped perpetrate. This nugget was reported in South Korea’s OhMyNews, but was somehow overlooked by the paper of record.